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Some Things Are Better Left Said: A Discussion of the
Unstated Arguments Supporting and Opposing the
Supreme Court's Opinion in Nobelman v. American
Savings Bank
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,' the United States Supreme
Court required Leonard and Harriet Nobelman to repay their mortgage loan
in full.2 Many Americans might be inclined to ask why this had to be de-
cided by the Supreme Court, but bankruptcy attorneys, homestead mortga-
gees3 and Chapter 13 debtors4 knew why. The Nobelmans had borrowed
money to buy their home from the American Savings Bank and, after filing
a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy, had proposed a plan to repay only
$23,500 of the $71,335 they owed.5 Their plan depended on the interplay
between two bankruptcy code provisions, the consistent resolution of which
had eluded the lower courts.6
The Court's decision settled a significant conflict between bankruptcy
courts and the courts of appeals.7 In 1992, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit decided a similar case, but reached a result which
conflicted with the decisions of all other courts of appeals that had ad-
dressed the issue.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict.9
This Note explains the issue presented in Nobelman and analyzes the
Court's decision.' 0 The Note begins with a brief summary of bankruptcy
concepts and statutes," then discusses the Nobelman case"2 and highlights
1. 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). Editor's Note: The correct spelling of the debtor's name is
"Nobelman." Citations to the lower court opinions remain as originally captioned.
2. Id. at 2111.
3. Homestead mortgagees are mortgage lenders who have loaned money secured by an in-
terest in the borrower's principal residence. See BLACK'S LAW DIerIoNARY 505 (abridged 6th ed.
1991) (defining homestead).
4. Chapter 13 debtors are borrowers who have filed a bankruptcy petition seeking protection
from their creditors. See infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
5. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2108.
6. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
7. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir.
1992), aft'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993) (noting that courts of appeals generally have reached one
conclusion and bankruptcy courts have reached the other); see also GEORGE M. TREIsrER Er AL.,
F NDAMENTALS OF BANKuytrcy LAw § 7.10(e), at 365 (3d ed. 1993) (indicating split of
authority).
8. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 486, 489. The other circuits that have considered the question are
the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
9. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
10. See infra notes 16-38, 119-154 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 38-75 and accompanying text.
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some of the cases addressing the same issue.13 After explaining some of
the conflicting arguments the courts have used, 14 the Note concludes that
the Supreme Court's treatment of Nobelman disregarded significant argu-
ments used below and in the conflicting cases,"5 but nonetheless effectively
resolved the split.
Bankruptcy is traditionally defined as the state of being unable to pay
one's debts as they are, or become, due. 16 While the Bankruptcy Code of
1978"7 (the "Code") covers a variety of situations, Nobelman involves
Chapter 13.18 The purpose of that chapter is to enable an individual, under
court supervision and protection, to develop and follow a plan for the repay-
ment of his debts over an extended period of time. 19 In some cases, the
plan may call for full repayment.2 0 In others, it may offer creditors a per-
centage of their claims in full settlement.2 '
Chapter 13 allows a debtor seeking protection from creditors to file a
petition with the Bankruptcy Court.22 The filing of the petition automati-
cally stays all collection actions against the petitioner.23 Chapter 13 re-
quires a debtor to submit a bankruptcy plan for repaying debts existing at
the time of the petition over a period of up to five years.2 4 Once the bank-
ruptcy court approves the plan, the debtor must submit a portion of his
income to the bankruptcy estate.' The bankruptcy trustee administers the
estate and uses its assets to make the plan payments.26
Two particular provisions of the Code affect Chapter 13 plans and are
important to the disposition of Nobelman: §§ 506(a)2 7 and 1322(b)(2).28
Section 506(a) provides that the claims of undersecured creditors2 9 must be
13. See infra notes 76-118 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 78-118 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 119-51 and accompanying text.
16. BLACK'S LAW DicroNARY 100 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
19. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 239 (1984) (including language
from H.R. Re. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6079).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1988 & Supp. TV 1992).
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
29. Undersecured creditors are secured creditors who are owed an amount of money greater
than the total value of all the property securing the debt. TPEsTER Er AL., supra note 7, § 6.03, at
297.
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split into two claim components, one secured and one unsecured.30 The
bankruptcy court then determines the value of the property securing the
debt.31 That value is the amount of the secured claim component.32 The
remaining debt becomes the unsecured claim component.33 The difference
between secured and unsecured creditors is significant: secured creditors
(those requiring collateral for a loan) are generally repaid in full, but un-
secured creditors (those not requiring collateral for a loan) are merely re-
paid a small percentage of their claims, if any.34
For example, assume a person buys a car for $10,000, drives it for two
years and files for bankruptcy after missing nearly a year of payments. The
value of the car could be $6000, even though the debtor might owe $8000
due to interest and missed payments. In such a case, if the court accepts the
$6000 valuation of the car, the creditor's claim may be split into a secured
claim component of $6000 and an unsecured claim component of $2000.
While the $6000 component will be treated as a secured claim under the
Code, the remaining $2000 will be treated as unsecured.
Unlike § 506(a), which governs all bankruptcy filings, § 1322(b)(2)
applies exclusively to Chapter 13. It allows the debtor's plan35 to modify
the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, except those creditors holding
a "claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence." 36 These creditors are referred to as "home-
stead mortgagees." Under § 1322(b)(2), the lender in the above auto loan
hypothetical is susceptible to some modification of her rights under the
30. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 239 & n.3 (1988). Although these
components both represent part of the overall claim, they are each treated as independent claims.
TRmsTR r AL., supra note 7, § 7.10(e).
The text of § 506(a) is set out in relevant part below:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in
the estate's interest in such property... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the
value of such creditor's interest. . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See TrtMsTER Er AL., supra note 7, § 7.10(f), at 367.
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483,488 (5th Cir. 1992),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). Section 1322(b)(2) provides:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may ...
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of hold-
ers of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims[.]
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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plan, because she is simply a secured creditor, rather than a homestead
mortgagee. A homestead mortgagee, though, would be protected from any
modification of her claim.37
The issue in Nobelman was whether § 506(a) bifurcation operates to
split a mortgage lender's claim prior to the protection offered homestead
mortgagees under § 1322(b)(2). 38 More simply put, does § 1322(b)(2) pro-
tect the total claim of the homestead mortgagee, or just the secured claim
component as defined by § 506(a)?
The Nobelman saga began in 1984, when Leonard and Harriet
Nobelman borrowed $68,250 from American Savings Bank to buy their
home.39 The Nobelmans executed an adjustable rate mortgage note and
secured the loan with a deed of trust on their residence.4 0 By 1990, the
Nobelmans had failed to remit several of their payments; they filed a peti-
tion for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.41 The bank filed a
claim for the outstanding balance of the loan's principal, interest, and fees,
which totaled $71,335.42
After filing the bankruptcy petition, the Nobelmans submitted a Chap-
ter 13 plan to the court for approval. 43 That plan included an uncontro-
verted value of $23,500 for the home and proposed to split the mortgage
claim into secured and unsecured components in accordance with
§ 506(a).4 According to this proposal, the secured portion would have
equalled the $23,500 value of the residence, while the remaining amount
would have been labelled unsecured and treated equally with all other un-
secured claims.'a Significantly, the unsecured creditors would have re-
ceived nothing under the proposed plan.4 6 The plan would, in effect, have
reduced the $71,355 claim to the $23,500 secured component and dis-
charged the remaining $47,855 with no payment whatsoever. The bank ob-
jected, claiming that the plan would modify its rights as a homestead
mortgagee, which were protected under § 1322(b)(2).47 The bank argued
that the exception in § 1322(b)(2) encompassed the entire mortgage claim,
not just the secured claim component.4 8 In contrast, the Nobelmans main-
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
38. Nobelman, 113 S. CL at 2108.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id; see also supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
42. Nobelman, 113 S. CL at 2108.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2108-09.
45. Id. at 2109.
46. Id.
47. Id; see also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
48. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1992),
aft'd, 113 S. CL 2106 (1993).
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tained the exception applied only to the secured claim component of the
mortgage claim, which § 506(a) had automatically reduced to the fair mar-
ket value of the residence.49
The bankruptcy court refused to confirm the proposed plan, and the
Nobelmans appealed.5 0 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision.5 1 The Fifth Circuit also upheld the decision.5 2 In doing so it con-
tradicted four other circuits that had allowed bifurcation of a mortgage
lender's claim pursuant to § 506(a).5 1 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari54 to resolve the split among the circuits.5
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit's ruling that disallowed bifurcation. 6 Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, employed a two-step statutory construction process to reconcile the
ostensibly conflicting provisions of the Code.57 The Court first fixed the
meaning of the key words used in the provisions: "rights" and "claims. 5 8
Next, the Court applied those meanings to the analysis of both §§ 506(a)
and 1322(b)(2) to derive the plain meanings of the provisions. 9
The Court first addressed the meaning of "rights. 6 ° It found no statu-
tory definition of rights in the Bankruptcy Code.6' Citing an earlier
Supreme Court decision,62 the Court held that, in bankruptcy litigation,
courts should look to state law to define property rights if there is no con-
trolling federal rule.63 Next, in defining "claims," the Court simply turned
to the definitions provision of the Code,' which defines "claims" as "any
49. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109.
50. Id.
51. In re Nobleman, 129 B.R. 98 (N.D. Tex. 1991), afftd, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), aftd,
113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
52. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1992),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
53. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1992); Easfland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton
Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
54. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
55. Nobelman, 113'S. Ct. at 2109.
56. Id. at 2111.
57. Id. at 2110-11.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2110.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979)).
63. Id.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The definition reads in full:
(5) "[C]laim" means
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equita-
ble, secured, or unsecured; or
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right to payment, whether... secure[d] or unsecured" as well as any "equi-
table remedy for breach of performance... [that] gives rise to a right to
payment."'65
These definitions served as the basis of the Court's apparently facile
disposal of the issue through a strict, literal construction of the Code. The
Court first applied state law to hold that the bank's rights were those rights
embodied in the loan documents. 66 The documents provided for the se-
cured party's right to receive monthly payments at a specified rate for a
specified period; to retain the lien until satisfaction of the debt; and finally
to accelerate, foreclose and sue for any deficiency.67 The Court held that
§ 1322(b)(2) prohibited the plan from modifying any of those rights.68
The Court then turned to the use of the word "claims" in
§ 1322(b)(2). 69 Reading "claim" as encompassing all rights to payment,
including both the secured and unsecured components, the Court rejected
the Nobelmans' contention that § 1322(b)(2) protected only the secured
component of the bank's claim from modificationZ0 The Court reasoned
that Congress's use in § 1322(b)(2) of the broadly defined word "claim"
instead of "the term of art 'secured claim"' reflected a choice to protect
both components of the claim.7'
The majority conceded that there was an alternative, grammatically
acceptable construction which would interpret the word "claim," as used in
the exception to § 1322(b)(2), to refer only to the secured component of the
mortgage lender's claim.72 The Court rejected that construction as unrea-
sonable, however, because such a construction would fundamentally alter
the bank's contract rights regarding the unsecured component of the
claim.73
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion to explain the
somewhat counterintuitive result of Nobelman: less protection under the
Bankruptcy Code for a debtor's home than for other assets in the estate.74
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un-
disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured ....
65. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)).
66. Id. at 2110 (citing 3 Tax. PRop. CODE AM. §§ 51.002-.005 (West Supp. IV 1993)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2111.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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He explained that such treatment reflected congressional intent to "en-
courage the flow of capital into the home lending market."7 5
Before the Supreme Court addressed the Nobelman issue, both bank-
ruptcy courts and the courts of appeals had visited it many times.76 Until
Nobelman, no circuit court of appeals had disallowed the bifurcation, but
the majority of bankruptcy courts had found bifurcation impermissible.7
Several cases from each perspective illustrate the various arguments used to
defend and attack bifurcation.
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to consider the issue,
in In re Hougland.78 The fact pattern in Hougland and all such cases essen-
tially mirrored the fact pattern in Nobelman: a debtor in Chapter 13 sought
to "cram-down 71 9 a homestead mortgagee's claim over the mortgagee's ob-
jection. 0 As in Nobelman, the debtors in Hougland sought to repay only
the value of the real property and treat the remaining portion as unsecured
debt.8 ' Hougland exemplifies the rule of the last antecedent, a common
pro-bifurcation argument.82
75. Id. at 2112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
77. Id.; see, e.g., Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d
176, 185 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing bifurcation); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923
F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d
1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). But see, e.g., Etchin v. Star Servs., Inc. (In re Etchin), 128
B.R. 662, 669 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (disallowing bifurcation); In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 7
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (same); Boullion v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R. 549,551 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990) (same); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733,737 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (same); In re Sauber,
115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (same); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1990) (same); In re Kaczmarczyk 107 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (same); In re
Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742, 746-47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (disallowing modification of loan by
homestead mortgagee). A comparison of the mortgage balances and actual values across the cases
listed reveals no discernible trend in greater judicial protection for lenders with a greater percent-
age of their mortgage claim classified as unsecured after the operation of § 506(a).
78. Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
79. "Cram-down" is a term of art that refers to a debtor's attempt to bifurcate a secured claim
and discharge much or all of the unsecured component. In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 486 n.5
(5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). Cram-down of a claim for an undersecured mort-
gage has been called "lien stripping."
80. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1182-83.
81. Id. at 1183 ("The Debtors seek to modify the rights of the lender in the portion of the
balance that exceeds the value of the real property, and we must decide if they may do that."). In
Hougland, the petitioners filed for bankruptcy while owing $51,090.78 on a note secured by a first
lien on the petitioners' principal residence, which had a value of $47,240. Id.
82. See id. at 1184; infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also Bellamy v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying rule
of last antecedent); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir.
1991) (same); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990)
(same).
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The Hougland court initially assumed that the general application of
§ 506(a) to Chapter 13 dictates that the words "secured claim," as used in
§ 1322(b)(2), mean the secured claim component of § 506(a).83 The court
then examined the language of § 1322(b)(2), focussing on the placement of
the exception clause.8 4 This placement-based analysis has been labeled the
rule of the last antecedent.
Section 1332 (b)(2) first addresses the rights of holders of secured
claims, then discusses the rights of holders of unsecured claims-in that
order." The exception clause (the "other than" clause) is located after the
secured portion but before the unsecured portion. The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the exception clause applies only to "secured claims," its imme-
diate antecedent in the sentence, and not to any unsecured claims.8 6 The
court reasoned that holding that § 1322(b)(2) prohibits bifurcation as a
modification of the homestead mortgagee's rights "beg[s] the question, for
it postulates that the other than clause does refer to the unsecured portion of
the claim."8" Accordingly, the Hougland court permitted the bifurcation. 88
A Texas bankruptcy court announced an opposite result in In re
Schum.89 There, the court confronted the familiar fact pattern:90 the
debtor's plan proposed bifurcation and payment of only the amount of a
contested valuation.91 The lender objected to the plan as a modification of
its rights as a homestead mortgagee.9
2
Discussing both statutory construction and legislative intent, the court
ruled that bifurcation of a homestead mortgagee's claim was impermissi-
ble93 and held that § 1322(b)(2), as a specific provision, trumped § 506(a),
83. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183. Reference to the text of the rule is helpful to understand the
court's reasoning. Section 1322(b) provides that the plan may "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the
debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of
holders of any class of claims."
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
84. Hougland, at 1184.
85. 111 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
86. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 1182. It is interesting to note that the Hougland decision affirmed a district court's
reversal of a bankruptcy court's holding that bifurcation was impermissible.
89. In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 162 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
90. Id. at 160. The debtor, David Allen Schum, borrowed $207,960 from a bank, secured by
a deed of trust on his primary residence. Id. The note was a two-year demand note with interim
interest payments. ld After the lender made demand, Schum filed for bankruptcy and valued the
property at $177,000. Id.
91. Id. The bank valued the property at $187,000-$20,000 below the amount owed on the
note. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 162.
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a provision of general applicability.9 4 Additionally, the Schum court relied
heavily on the congressional intent surrounding the enactment of
§ 1322(b)(2). 5 The Schum court detailed a specific congressional intent to
protect "the home mortgagor who performed 'a valuable social service
through their loans."' 96 The court wrote: "It is clear that Congress intended
special treatment for a creditor whose claim is secured only by a security
interest in the debtor's principal residence."97
In addition, the Schum court seemed to indicate that allowing bifurca-
tion would treat claims secured only by a lien on the debtor's principal
residence no differently from claims secured by other types of property.
The court stated: 'The proposed modification of the debt at issue would
have the effect of treating real property secured by only a lien on the
debtor's principal residence in the same manner as any other property se-
cured by a lien."98 Although the Schum court stopped short of expressly
stating the rule, it apparently sought to avoid a construction that would
render the § 1322(b)(2) exception for homestead mortgagees mere
surplusage.
99
In In re Bellamy, on similar facts, the Second Circuit combined a con-
gressional intent argument with the Hougland rule to allow bifurcation.10
94. Id. at 160-61. Cases allowing bifurcation have consistently declined to address the argu-
ment that the specific provision should prevail over the general provision. See In re Mitchell, 125
B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) ("Although there are many cases allowing bifurcation, none an-
swer the specific-general statutory analysis argument. Most ignore the argument without
discussion.").
95. Schum, 112 B.R. at 161-62. The Schum court detailed the legislative intent as follows:
The underlying theme behind this provision is the protection of home mortgage lenders.
It seems that it was plausibly argued to the Senate that due to the nature of
home-lending, the mortgagors required additional protection under the Bankruptcy Code
in order to guarantee the free flow of credit to individuals who desire to purchase a
home.
Id. at 162 n.3. For a survey of the congressional history of Chapter 13 and § 1322 specifically, see
Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 238-40, 242-46 (5th Cir. 1984).
96. Schum, 112 B.R. at 161 (citing Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 246); cf. Bellamy v. Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that protec-
tion of only the secured component of the mortgage claim would satisfy that intent because, unlike
other secured claims, "the secured portion of the residential mortgagee's claim may not be
modified").
97. Schum, 112 B.R. at 162. Apparently, the Hougland and Bellamy courts did not appreci-
ate the clarity of the Grubbs discussion regarding the legislative intent behind § 1322(b)(2).
98. Id. The exception in the statute refers to a claim secured only by a lien on the debtor's
principal residence, not property. The court seemed to substitute real property for debt, but lend-
ers do not secure property by a lien on property; they secure debt by a lien on property. Regard-
less of the semantics, it seems clear that the court meant that allowing bifurcation would render
the exception meaningless by letting the plan treat those claims secured only by the debtor's
residence as it would treat any other undersecured claims.
99. Id.
100. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.
1992). In Bellamy, the debtors had executed a mortgage agreement for $133,000 to enable them
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The Bellamy court indicated that a central consideration of Congress in re-
forming the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 was to refocus the secured/unsecured
classification on claims, rather than creditors.' The court abided by this
new focus in adopting a claims-centered construction of the word "rights"
as used in § 1322(b)(2), finding that "the 'rights' which may not be modi-
fied under § 1322(b)(2) must be defined in terms of the claim, not with
reference to the status of the claimant."'" The court then combined this
narrow construction of rights under § 1322(b)(2) with the Hougland rule of
the last antecedent and held that the exception clause protects only the se-
cured component of a homestead mortgagee's claim.' 03
Dewsnup v. Timm,"° a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case decided recently by
the Supreme Court, sheds some light on the lien-stripping issue.' 5 In Dew-
snup, the debtors borrowed approximately $120,000 to buy farmland, which
at the time of the petition was worth less than the amount owed. 10 6 The
debtor proposed to bifurcate his lender's claim under § 506(a), then use the
lien voiding provision of § 506(d) to reduce the amount of the lender's lien
to the amount allowed as the secured claim component under § 506(a).107
The issue in Dewsnup was whether the phrase "allowed secured
claim," as used in § 506(d), referred to the secured component from
§ 506(a), or the overall claim prior to bifurcation.' The Court adopted an
admittedly problematic reading of § 506: it held that the allowed secured
claim in § 506(d) referred to an allowed claim that was also a fully secured
to buy their home. Id. at 178. At the time of the bankruptcy petition, the amount owed on the
note more than $150,000, and the value of the home was $127,500. Id. The debtors proposed a
plan that would discharge the difference as unsecured debt. Id.
101. Id. (citing Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504,507 (7th Cir. 1981)). This particular
congressional intent is not discussed in the other significant cases addressing this issue. See supra
note 77; see also Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 238-46 (5th Cir. 1984)
(surveying the legislative history and intent of § 1322(b)(2), but failing to mention Congress's
intent to shift focus from creditors to claims).
102. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 180.
103. Id. at 180-81.
104. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). Chapter 7 of the Code provides for liquidation
of the debtor's non-exempt assets to fund the bankruptcy estate, which in turn pays out all the
assets and extinguishes most remaining debt. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
105. For a discussion of "lien stripping," see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
106. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
107. Id. Section 506(d) provides:
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an al-
lowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity
to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
108. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776-77.
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claim, not the allowed secured component contemplated by § 506(a) be-
cause § 506(a) was not a definitional provision.'0 9
The Dewsnup majority defended its reasoning with four rationales,
based on both practical and prudential considerations. 110 First, allowing the
lien stripping would, in effect, "freeze the creditor's secured interest at the
judicially determined valuation"; thus, any later increase in value would
accrue to the debtor as a "windfall.""' Second, pre-Code bankruptcy law
allowed liens to pass through bankruptcy proceedings unaffected." 2 Third,
pre-Code liquidation proceedings similarly did not allow any involuntary
reduction of a creditor's lien, except for payment of the debt." 3 Finally, the
Court admitted its reluctance "to accept arguments that would interpret the
Code, however vague the particular language... might be, to effect a major
change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discus-
sion in the legislative history.""' 4 The Court defended the use of legislative
intent by characterizing the statute's language as ambiguous.' 5
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, dissented vigorously and at
length in Dewsnup."6 The dissenters insisted that the phrase "allowed se-
cured claim" should be read to have a uniform meaning across the Code and
that the terms consistently refer to the secured component contemplated by
§ 506(a).1' 7 The dissenters vehemently argued that the abandonment of
plain meaning "sans textual or structural analysis" would cause "innumera-
ble statutory texts [to] become worth litigating.""' 8
Apparently, those innumerable texts included §§ 1322(b)(2) and
506(a). In Nobelman, the Supreme Court had the advantage of a
well-developed body of case law from the lower courts, albeit with widely
inconsistent results."19 Those cases offered the Court a variety of argu-
109. Id. at 778-79.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 778.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 779.
114. Id. (citing United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484 U.S. 365,
380 (1988); Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 572 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1989)). The Dew-
snup Court found no discussion of an intent to change pre-Code treatment of liens. Id.
115. Id. Justice Scalia, in his rather ardent dissent, claimed that the plain meaning of § 506(d)
is readily apparent and characterized the majority's definition of ambiguous as "a status appar-
ently achieved by being the subject of disagreement between self-interested litigants." Id. at
780-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. lad at 779-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia's desired holding in
Dewsnup would seem to mandate an opposite result in Nobelman, in which he joined the majority.
118. Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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ments12 ° for and against the result the Court reached in Nobelman. The
Court resolved a significant split among those courts by relying not on the
arguments of the lower courts, but simply on textual analysis. 1 '
In addressing the correct reading of "rights" as used in § 1322(b)(2),
the Supreme Court found little guidance in the lower courts' decisions. 122
This was particularly true because the leading cases equated "rights" with
"claims."' 123 The Hougland court simply did not address the definition of
"rights." Instead, the court discussed how to construe claims and the excep-
tion clause.124 In fact, the Hougland court adopted the reasoning of those
cases that have "permitted the debtor's plan to modify the unsecured por-
tion [of the mortgagee's claim].""I This language illustrates that the court
was not focused on rights, the main thrust of § 1322(b)(2), but instead on
claims. Similarly, the Bellamy court wrote that "the 'rights' which may not
be modified under § 1322(b)(2) must be defined in terms of the claim, not
with reference to the status of the claimant." '26
The Supreme Court took a different approach. It pointed out that
§ 1322(b)(2) "focuses on the modification of the 'rights of holders"' and
proceeded to define those rights broadly under state law and the pertinent
loan documents.' 27 In Nobelman, the Court looked to the status of the
lender, indicating that "[b]y virtue of its mortgage contract with petitioners,
the bank is indisputably the holder of a claim secured by a lien on petition-
ers' home."' 28 Such status, the Court said, protects all of the lender's rights
from modification by the plan, although the Court did concede that the
120. See supra notes 78-115 and accompanying text.
121. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109-10.
122. See id. at 2109 n.2 (citing lower court decisions without discussion).
123. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d
Cir. 1992); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir.
1989); supra notes 83-88, 100-103 and accompanying text.
124. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183-84.
125. Id. at 1183 (citing with approval In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832 (D.N.J. 1989)); In re Frost, 96
B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989), aff'd, 123 B.R. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Kehm v. Citicorp
Homeowners Serv., Inc. (In re Kehm), 90 B.R. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Caster v. United
States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In re
Bruce), 40 B.R. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984)). But see In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703,706-07 (D.N.D.
1988) (holding that the exception in § 1322(b)(2) prohibits modification of homestead mortga-
gee's rights, even to unsecured claim component); In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988) (same); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524-25 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (same); In re Hemsing,
75 B.R. 689, 791-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (same); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr.
D.NJ. 1986) (same).
126. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 180.
127. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109 ("'These are the rights that were bargained for by the
mortgagor and mortgagee.., and are the rights protected from modification by § 1322(b)(2)."')
(quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992)).
128. Id.
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bankruptcy proceeding itself necessarily would modify some rights outside
the plan.129
However, the Court did not provide support for this broad, sta-
tus-based view of "rights," nor did it address the Hougland court's counter-
argument that defining "rights" without reference to particular claims
presupposes that the "other than" clause actually refers only to the un-
secured component of the claim.130 Similarly, the Court failed to address
the Bellamy court's view that a fundamental concept of the Bankruptcy
Code was to classify claims, and not creditors, as secured or unsecured.13 '
The Court did, however, discuss the rule of the last antecedent as set
forth in Bellamy and Hougland.132 This rule suggests the exception clause
in § 1322(b)(2) modifies only "secured claims" (its immediate antecedent in
the language of the provision), not "unsecured claims" (which appears later
in the subsection). The Court admitted that the rule was acceptable in the
grammatical sense, but used the Code's broad definition of claim as "any
'right to payment, whether ... secure[d] or unsecured"' to derive the plain
meaning of the clause without reference to what it modifies. 133 Thus, the
Court wrote that "[i]t is also plausible, therefore, to read 'a claim secured
by a [homestead lien]' as referring to the lienholder's entire claim."' 34
In rejecting the debtor's structural construction argument, the Court
did not posit any structural argument, much less a better one, than the lower
courts had. Instead, it relied on a textual argument, finding a broad mean-
ing of the word "claims" based on the definitional provision of the Code.135
This textual interpretation did not address the main point of the rule of the
last antecedent: indicating what part of the rule the exception clause modi-
fies. Here, the Court failed to provide an alternative construction of the
statutes, leaving the reader to assume the only interpretation that is consis-
tent with their holding: the "exception clause" modifies the word "rights."
Such a reading gives the clause and the provision the meaning the Court
desires, and counters in kind the structural rule of the last antecedent.
The Court also declined to address adequately three major foci of
lower courts deciding this issue: the Dewsnup opinion,136 the legislative
129. Id. at 2110. The Court indicated that a creditor's right to sue on his debt is automatically
stayed by a bankruptcy petition pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992), and debtors
are allowed to cure prepetition defaults under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). Id.
130. Hougland v. Lomes & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir.
1989); see also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
131. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d
Cir. 1992); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
132. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111; see also supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
133. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
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intent behind § 1322(b)(2), 13 7 and the canon of construction that favors spe-
cific statutes over general ones. 138
Of the three, the failure to discuss the Dewsnup opinion is the most
easily understood, although arguably the most short-sighted. There are sev-
eral possible explanations for the Court's refusal to address the rationale of
Dewsnup. First, the Dewsnup Court specifically limited its result to the
facts of that particular case.139 The Court in Nobelman may simply have
heeded its own intended limitation of the extension of Dewsnup. Addition-
ally, the Court may have exercised judicial prudence by refusing to address
any grounds it considered unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Fi-
nally, on a more practical note, Justice Thomas, who wrote for the majority
in Nobelman, took no part in the Dewsnup decision 40 and may have re-
frained from mentioning it because the Court's polarized views1 41 might
have upset the efficient disposition of Nobelman.
The Nobelman opinion might have profited by the example of the
Dewsnup Court, however. The Dewsnup Court, like the Nobelman Court,
rejected a rational and appealing plain meaning construction. 142 The Dew-
snup Court, though, articulated at least two nonconstruction arguments to
support its decision: (1) the desire to avoid awarding the debtor a potential
windfall and (2) the reluctance to interpret statutes to effect a significant
137. See supra note 95-97 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Although the Court cited Dewsnup v. Timm,
112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), in support of its bargain theory, 113 S. Ct. at 2110, and Justice Stevens
briefly pointed to the legislative intent, id. at 2111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring), neither was dis-
cussed as fully as in the lower courts opinions. See Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re
Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1992), (labeling the Court's treatment of the analogous
Chapter 7 question in Dewsnup as instructive in the disposition of Nobleman) aftd, 113 S. Ct.
2106 (1993); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
182-84 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinguishing the Dewsnup analysis as irrelevant because it considered
different language, concerned Chapter 7, and was motivated by concern about changes in
pre-Code practice rather than protection of mortgage lenders). Such thorough treatment by the
leading conflicting lower court opinions would seem to merit at least a passing discussion by the
Supreme Court.
139. The Court wrote:
Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illus-
trate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all
possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other
facts to await their legal resolution on another day.
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
140. Id. at 779.
141. Id. at 788 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Having taken this case to resolve uncertainty regard-
ing one provision, we end up by spawning confusion regarding scores of others. I respectfully
dissent.").
142. Id. at 778. The Court ruled consistently that there was a lack of legislative intent to alter
traditional bankruptcy jurisprudence. Id.; see also id. at 781 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court
makes no attempt to establish a textual or structural basis for overriding the plain meaning of
§ 506(d), but rests its decision on policy intuitions of a legislative character .... .").
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change without some indication of a legislative intent to do so. 143 The
Nobelman Court did not offer any supporting nonconstruction arguments,
even though they existed.
Similarly, the Court could have discussed legislative history. 44 Why
the majority in Nobelman declined to address the legislative intent, which
clearly supports its result, 145 is difficult to understand. Most lower cases
reaching the same result as the Nobelman Court have addressed the legisla-
tive intent, as have all decisions by the courts of appeals on this issue.
14 6
One possibility is that the Court was so confident in its interpretation that it
decided a discussion of legislative intent was unnecessary. Having rejected
the petitioner's construction and the rule of the last antecedent as "not com-
pelled," 47 the Court failed to indicate satisfactorily why its own "also plau-
sible" reading was compelled. The Court thus rejected an admittedly valid
construction and replaced it with a construction based on congressional
word choice and the Code's definition of claim. The Court mentioned Con-
gress's choice of words, but did not indicate the motivation or background
of that choice. The legislative intent behind the decision to grant homestead
mortgagees greater protection is well-documented and offered firm support
for the Court's construction.
148
Additional support for the Court's construction was similarly
well-documented and available, based on a canon of construction. Oddly,
in a case based exclusively on statutory construction arguments, the Court
ignored the construction argument most frequently offered to support the
result itreached. Many lower courts relied on the "tenet of statutory con-
struction that, regardless of the inclusiveness of the general language of a
statute, it does not apply or prevail over matters specifically dealt with in
143. Id. at 779; see also supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
145. See Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 488-89 (5th Cir.
1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993) ("The legislative history also indicates that the Congress
intended this result [the protection of home mortgage lenders].") (citing Grubbs v. Houston First
Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984)).
146. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
181-84 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1414-15 (10th
Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1990);
Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1989);
Boullion v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Chavez, 117
B.R. 733, 736-37 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 198-99 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 161-62 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R.
200, 202-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
147. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
148. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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another part of the same enactment." 149 One court, in fact, relied almost
exclusively on that argument to reach the same holding as the Nobelman
Court.150 The Fifth Circuit, in its disposition of this case, expressly held
that "the specific language of § 1322(b)(2) prevails over the general lan-
guage of § 506(a)."'151 Yet, nowhere in the opinion does the Nobelman
Court address this canon of construction.
Commentators have criticized the Court for its almost exclusively tex-
tual bankruptcy jurisprudence under Chief Justice Rehnquist. 1 2  The
Nobelman case was recognized as a chance for the Court to begin to de-
velop a principled and measured approach to bankruptcy, as well as a
chance to redress the harm Dewsnup did to the principles of statutory con-
struction.15 3 In a case that clearly lent itself to a variety of arguments, the
Court maintained its textual tradition. 154
The Court in Nobelman valued simple construction and avoided ad-
dressing legislative intent, its own analogous precedent, and even complex
construction arguments. The reasons for the Court's terse opinion 55 and its
refusal to address several of the lower courts' approaches to this issue re-
main unclear. After reading Nobelman, though, two points are clear. First,
bifurcation of a homestead mortgagee's claim is impermissible. Second,
the Court's disposition of Nobelman, with its unitary focus on text and re-
fusal to address other arguments, is intellectually unsatisfying and offers
little hope for a coherent fabric of bankruptcy jurisprudence.
DEREK C. ABBOTr
149. Chavez, 117 B.R. at 734; see In re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); Boul-
lion, 123 B.R. at 550; Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199; Schum, 112 B.R. at 160-61; Kaczmarczyk, 107
B.R. at 202.
150. Mitchell, 125 B.R. at 6-7 (criticizing recent opinions, particularly Bellamy, for failing to
address that tenet of construction).
151. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 1992),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993). In fact, the Fifth Circuit addressed Dewsnup, legislative intent, and
this canon of construction. Id. at 487-89.
152. See generally Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Con-
junctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 823
(1991) (criticizing the Rehnquist Court's lack of a coherent bankruptcy jurisprudence).
153. See William E. Callahan, Jr., Note, Dewsnup v. Timm and Nobelman v. American Sav-
ings Bank. The Strip Down of Liens in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 Bankruptcies, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 405, 416-21 (1993).
154. See suprd notes 119-51 and accompanying text.
155. The opinion, including the concurrence, occupies only four and one-half pages in the
reporter. See Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2106-12.
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